World food prospects by Pinstrup-Andersen, Per et al.
WORLD FOOD PROSPECTS : 
CRITICAL ISSUES FOR THE
EARLY TWENTY -FIRST CENTURY
Per Pinstrup-Andersen, Rajul Pandya-Lorch,
and Mark W. Rosegrant
FOOD POLICY REPORT
INTERNATIONAL FOOD POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE
WASHINGTON , D.C.
OCTOBER 1999Executive Summary 5
Introduction 7
Prospects for Food Security 8
Emerging Issues 19





bout 73 million people will be added to
the world’s population every year
between 1995 and 2020, increasing it by 32
percent to reach 7.5 billion. Much of this
population growth will occur in the cities of
the developing world. While its rural popula-
tion is expected to increase by less than
300 million during this period, the develop-
ing world’s urban population could double to
3.4 billion in 2020. Per capita incomes are
expected to increase in all major developing
regions over this period. Meeting the food
needs of a growing and urbanizing popula-
tion with rising incomes will have profound
implications for the world’s agricultural pro-
duction and trading systems in coming
decades. IFPRI research suggests some of
the major developments that will character-
ize the world food situation during the next
two decades to 2020:
•  Almost all of the increase in world food
demand will take place in developing
countries. Developing countries will
account for about 85 percent of the
increase in the global demand for cere-
als and meat between 1995 and 2020.
•  H o w e v e r, a developing-country person in
2020 will consume less than half the
amount of cereals consumed by a 
developed-country person and slightly
more than one-third of the meat products.
•  A demand-driven “livestock revolution” is
under way in the developing world.
Between the early 1970s and the mid-
1990s, the volume of meat consumed in
the developing world grew almost three
times as fast as it did in the developed
countries. Demand for meat in the
developing world is projected to double
between 1995 and 2020.
•  In response to the strong demand for
meat products, demand for cereals for
feeding livestock will double in develop-
ing countries. Demand for maize in
developing countries will increase much
faster than for any other cereal and will
overtake demand for rice and wheat by
2020.
•  To meet demand, the world’s farmers
will have to produce 40 percent more
grain in 2020. Increases in cultivated
area are expected to contribute only
about one-fifth of the global cereal pro-
duction between 1995 and 2020, so
improvements in crop yields will be
required to bring about the necessary
production increases. However, it is 
worrisome that growth in farmers’ cereal
yields is slowing from the heyday of the
Green Revolution during the 1970s.
•  Food production is increasing much
faster in the developing world than in the
developed world. By 2020, the develop-
ing world will be producing 59 percent of
the world’s cereals and 61 percent of the
world’s meat.
•  Nevertheless, cereal production in the
developing world will not keep pace with
demand, and net cereal imports by
developing countries will almost double
between 1995 and 2020 to 192 million
tons in order to fill the gap between pro-
duction and demand. Net meat imports
by developing countries will increase
eightfold during this period to 6.6 million
tons.
•  About 60 percent of the developing
world’s net cereal imports in 2020 will
come from the United States. Eastern
Europe and the former Soviet Union are
forecast to emerge as major net
exporters, and the European Union and
Australia are projected to increase their
net exports as well.
•  Food prices will remain steady or fall
slightly between 1995 and 2020. T h e
much slower decrease in food prices
compared with past trends is due to the6
continued slowdown in crop yield
increases, as well as strong growth in
demand for meat in developing countries.
•  With increased production and imports,
per capita food availability in the devel-
oping world will increase to 2,800 calo-
ries per day by 2020, an increase of
about 9 percent over 1995.
•  In the scenario described here, food
insecurity and malnutrition will persist in
2020 and beyond. We project that 135
million children under five years of age
will be malnourished in 2020, a decline
of only 15 percent from 160 million in
1995. Child malnutrition is expected to
decline in all major developing regions
except Sub-Saharan Africa, where the
number of malnourished children is fore-
cast to increase by about 30 percent to
reach 40 million by 2020. With more
than 77 percent of the developing
world’s malnourished children in 2020,
Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia will
remain “hot spots” of child malnutrition
and food insecurity.
When IFPRI prepared its last Food
Policy Report on the world food situation
two years ago, it highlighted recent develop-
ments and emerging issues influencing
prospects for global food security. Many of
these issues are still present, and some
have escalated in importance. In this report,
we identify and discuss six critical issues
that, at the threshold of the next century,
could significantly influence the world food
situation. First, new information on nutrition
is shedding fresh light on which policy-
related variables could help improve the
nutritional status of children; this could help
refocus efforts to eliminate child malnu-
trition. Second, world market prices for
wheat, maize, and rice, adjusted for infla-
tion, are the lowest they have been in the
last century. This situation may threaten pro-
ducer incomes and future food production
and stocks. Third, the next round of trade 
negotiations sponsored by the World Trade
Organization will begin in November 1999.
Poor countries and poor people risk losing
out on the economic benefits embodied in
further trade liberalization. To gain from
trade talks, developing countries must par-
ticipate effectively in the negotiations. The
last three issues focus on approaches to
increasing productivity on small-scale farms
in developing countries, in particular on the
potential of agroecological approaches, the
potential role of modern biotechnology, and
the relevance of new information technology
and precision farming. These issues are
hotly debated at present, and the outcomes
of these debates may influence the food




he last IFPRI Food Policy Report on the
world food situation, prepared two years
ago, highlighted recent developments and
emerging issues influencing the prospects
for global food security.1 Many of these
issues are still present, and some have
escalated in importance. Although concerns
about the future Chinese food situation have
subsided with two years of surplus grain
production in China and net exports, the
extent to which the Indian population will
expand consumption of livestock products in
the future remains unresolved. The future
food situation in the former Soviet Union is
still unclear, and the success of the eco-
nomic transformations in that region is
uncertain. Although many local successes
have taken place, the Sub-Saharan African
food situation is still extremely difficult.
Large-scale breakthroughs in agricultural
productivity and improvements in food 
security are yet to occur in that region.
Concerns about declining soil fertility in
many low-income countries and growing
competition over water in many locations
have further escalated during the last 
couple of years, as has the uncertainty 
surrounding the future use of modern bio-
technology for agriculture. The declining
trend in food aid availability since 1993 has
been reversed, owing primarily to low inter-
national food prices and increasing stock
levels in traditional exporting countries com-
bined with the emergence of large-scale
crises in Indonesia, Russia, and the Balkans
during 1998 and 1999. Whether this will be
the beginning of an upward trend in food aid
or merely a short-term blip will depend
largely on what happens to international
grain prices and stock levels in industrial
nations. Future food aid will be determined
primarily by supply since demand far
exceeds the likely availability. Food safety
concerns, particularly in Western Europe,
have exploded during the last two years
partly because of consumer uncertainties
and fears about the health risks associated
with genetically modified food and partly
because of inappropriate government
responses to perceived health-threatening
occurrences in the food chain. 
This report provides a summary of the
most recent results from IFPRI projections
of the future world food situation. It then
identifies and discusses six recent develop-
ments and emerging issues that will influ-
ence the prospects for global food security.
The first of these issues is the nutrition 
situation, which appears to be deteriorating
in some countries, particularly in Sub-
Saharan Africa. At the same time, new
research is shedding light on how child 
malnutrition may be reduced in developing
countries, which could help refocus efforts
to eliminate child malnutrition.
The second issue is grain prices. Two
years ago, the discussion focused on the
causes and consequences of high prices for
maize and wheat. Today, the very low prices
for these commodities are a cause of con-
cern, because they may threaten producer
incomes and future food production and
stocks. Third, the next round of trade negoti-
ations sponsored by the World Trade
Organization (WTO) will begin in November
1999, and agriculture is expected to occupy
a prominent place in those negotiations.
The outcomes of these negotiations will sig-
nificantly influence food and agriculture pro-
duction and trading systems around the
world for years to come. 
The last three emerging issues focus on
approaches to increasing agricultural pro-
ductivity on small-scale farms in developing
countries. This report will discuss new 
evidence on the opportunities offered by
agroecological approaches, the potential
role of modern biotechnology, and the 
relevance of new information technology
and precision farming for small farmers in8
PROSPECTS FOR FOOD SECURITY
R
esults from IFPRI’s revised and updat-
ed global food model, the International
Model for Policy Analysis of Commodities
and Trade (IMPACT),2 suggest that under
the most likely scenario global demand for
cereals will increase by 39 percent between
1995 and 2020 to reach 2,466 million tons;
demand for meat will increase by 58 percent
to reach 313 million tons; and demand for
roots and tubers will increase by 37 percent
to reach 864 million tons.3 These large
increases in food demand will result not only
from population growth but also from urban-
ization, income growth, and associated
changes in lifestyles and food preferences.
About 73 million people, equivalent to
the current population of the Philippines, will
be added to the world’s population on aver-
age every year between 1995 and 2020,
increasing it by 32 percent to reach 7.5 bil-
lion in 2020 (Table 1). An overwhelming
97.5 percent of the increase in population is
expected to occur in the developing world,4
whose share of global population would
increase from 79 percent in 1995 to 84 per-
cent in 2020. Whereas the absolute popula-
tion increase will be largest in Asia, 1.1
billion, the relative increase will be greatest
in Africa, where the population is expected
to increase by 70 percent. This rate of
increase, however, is less than had been
projected in the past, partly because of
HIV/AIDS, which is ravaging the African
population. One-third of the total population
increase is anticipated to occur in just two
countries—China and India. However,
India’s population is growing much faster
and is poised to overtake that of China by
2035.5 The world’s growing population will
continue to exert pressure on food supplies.
Much of the population growth is expect-
ed to take place in the cities of the develop-
developing countries. These issues are
hotly debated at present, and the outcomes
of these debates and the related policies
may influence the food security of low-
income people for many years to come.
Table 1—World population, 1995 and 2020
Population level
Population increase, Share of
Region 1995 2020a 1995–2020 increase
(millions) (millions) (percent) (percent)
Latin America and the 
Caribbean 480 665 185 38.5 10.1
Africa 697 1,187 490 70.3 26.7
Asia, excluding Japan 3,311 4,421 1,110 33.5 60.5
China 1,221 1,454 233 19.1 12.7
India 934 1,272 338 36.2 18.4
Developed countries 1,172 1,217 45 3.8 2.5
Developing countries 4,495 6,285 1,790 39.8 97.5
World 5,666 7,502 1,836 32.4 100.0
Source: United Nations, World Population Prospects: The 1998 Revision (New York: UN, 1999).
a Medium-variant population projections.9
ing world. While its rural population is
expected to increase by less than 300 mil-
lion between 1995 and 2020, the developing
world’s urban population is projected to dou-
ble from 1.7 billion to reach 3.4 billion in
2020 (Figure 1). By 2020, about 52 percent
of the developing world’s population will be
living in urban areas, up from 38 percent in
1995.6 The rapid urbanization of the devel-
oping world and associated changes in
lifestyles will have significant effects on 
food preferences and hence on demand. 
As people move from rural to urban areas,
they tend to adopt more diverse diets, 
shifting away from coarse grains such as
sorghum and millet to rice, and sometimes
making secondary shifts from rice to wheat.
They also tend to consume more livestock
products, fruits, vegetables, and processed
foods. Agricultural production and research
systems will be challenged to keep abreast
of changing dietary preferences in coming
years.
Prospects for economic growth appear
favorable in the developing world, and like
urbanization, rising incomes will push peo-
ple toward more diversified diets. IMPACT
projects total income in the developing
world to increase at an average of 4.3 per-
cent annually between 1995 and 2020,
which would double per capita incomes to
more than US$2,200 (Table 2). Per capita
incomes in all major developing regions,
including Sub-Saharan A f r i c a ,7 are expected
to increase over this period. However, even
by 2020 Sub-Saharan Africa’s per capita
income is projected to be less than a dollar
a day; poverty of this magnitude will con-
demn many people in this region to food
insecurity. 
Although many millions of people could
remain mired in absolute poverty, meeting
the food needs of a growing and urbanizing
population with rising incomes will have pro-
found implications for the global agricultural
production and trading system in coming
decades. Some of the major developments
that will characterize the world food situation
during the next two decades to 2020 are the
following:
Almost all of the increase in world
food demand will take place in developing
c o u n t r i e s . Developing countries will
account for about 85 percent of the 690 mil-
lion ton increase in the global demand for
cereals between 1995 and 2020 (Figure 2).
Surprisingly, they will account for a similarly
large share of the 115 million ton increase in
the global demand for meat products over
the same period. China alone is forecast 
to account for one-quarter of the global
increase in demand for cereals and for two-
fifths of the increase in demand for meat.
Although India’s population is projected to
Figure 2—Share of increase in global
demand for cereals and meat
products, 1995–2020
Figure 1—Urban and rural population levels
in developing countries, 1950–2020
Source: United Nations, World Urbanization Prospects: The
1996 Revision (New York: UN, 1996). Source: IFPRI IMPACT simulations, July 1999.10
increase much faster than that of China
between 1995 and 2020, its share of the
global increase in demand for cereals is
expected to be about half that of China’s
while its share of the global increase in
demand for meat is expected to be only
one-tenth that of China. India is currently in
a period of economic transition; should poli-
cy reforms result in much faster economic
growth than currently expected, the demand
for meat and other livestock products,
including milk, could expand much faster in
that country.8 Also, it is still not clear
whether poverty or culturally based food
preferences are the primary reason why
meat consumption in India is so low. There
are indications that a large share of the
Indian population would prefer to eat more
meat if their income were to rise. By 2020,
developing countries as a group are fore-
cast to demand twice as much cereals and
meat products as developed countries
(Figure 3).
H o w e v e r, a developing-country per-
son in 2020 will consume less than half
the amount of cereals consumed by a
developed-country person and slightly
more than one-third of the meat products.
Per capita demand for cereals and meat
products in developing countries will contin-
ue to lag far behind that in developed coun-
tries, although the gap will begin to narrow
in the case of meat products (Figure 4). 
The disparities in demand can be explained
partly by lower incomes and greater depen-
dence on roots and tubers for sustenance in
developing countries (see Box 1) and by
much heavier use of cereals for feeding 
livestock in developed countries. Within the
developing world, increases in per capita
demand for cereals (food and feed) and
meat products in East Asia will far outstrip
those in other regions. This is not surprising
given that income levels are already relative-
ly high in East Asia and are projected to
continue to grow rapidly in the next two
decades, triggering massive increases 
in demand. In the case of cereals, for
instance, while per capita demand in Sub-
Saharan Africa is projected to increase by
13 kilograms between 1995 and 2020 to
reach 156 kilograms in 2020, in East Asia it
is projected to increase by 66 kilograms to
reach 373 kilograms in 2020, driven to a
large extent by increases in demand for
feedgrain.
Table 2–Income levels and growth, 1995–2020
Annual income  Per capita income level
growth rate,
Region 1995–2020 1995 2020
(percent) (1995 US$ per person)
Sub-Saharan Africaa 3.40 280 359
Latin America and the Caribbean 3.59 3,590 6,266
West Asia and North Africa 3.83 1,691 2,783
Southeast Asia 4.44 1,225 2,675
South Asia 5.01 350 830
East Asia 5.12 984 2,873
Developed countries 2.18 17,390 28,256
Developing countries 4.32 1,080 2,217
World 2.64 4,807 6,969
Source: IFPRI IMPACT simulations, July 1999.
a Excluding South Africa.11
A demand-driven “livestock revolu-
tion” is under way in the developing
world, with profound implications for
global agriculture, health, livelihoods,
and the environment. Between the early
1970s and the mid-1990s, the volume of
meat consumed in the developing countries
grew almost three times as much as it did in
the developed countries.9 With continued
population growth, urbanization, income
growth, and changes in lifestyles and food
preferences, we project that meat demand
in the developing world will double between
1995 and 2020 to 190 million tons and
increase by 25 percent in developed coun-
tries to 122 million tons. Demand for meat
will grow much faster than for cereals in the
developing world, by 2.8 percent per year
for meat compared with 1.8 percent for
cereals. In per capita terms, demand for
meat in developing countries will increase
by 40 percent between 1995 and 2020,
whereas it will increase by only 10 percent
for cereals. Worldwide, demand for poultry
meat is projected to increase by more than
85 percent between 1995 and 2020, for
beef by 50 percent, and for pigmeat by 45
percent. Nevertheless, demand for pigmeat
will continue to exceed demand for the other
meat commodities. In the developing world,
demand for poultry meat is expected to
increase fastest, at an average annual rate
of 3.6 percent, compared with 2.8 percent
for beef and 2.3 percent for pigmeat. East
Asia’s per capita demand is projected to
increase most, and Sub-Saharan Africa’s
and South Asia’s least; by 2020, East Asia’s
per capita demand for meat could be as
much as seven times that of South Asia
(Figure 5). It is crucial that governments and
industries prepare for this ongoing livestock
revolution in order to meet consumer
demand while alleviating stresses on public
health and natural resources (see Box 2).
Demand for cereals for feeding live-
stock will double in developing countries.
In response to the strong demand for meat
products, developing countries’ demand for
Figure 3—Total demand for cereals and meat
products, 1995–2020
Figure 4—Per capita demand for cereals and
meat products, 1995–2020
Figure 5—Per capita demand for meat
products, 1995–2020
Source: IFPRI IMPACT simulations, July 1999. Source: IFPRI IMPACT simulations, July 1999.
Source: IFPRI IMPACT simulations, July 1999.12
Many of the developing world’s poorest farmers
and food-insecure households are highly
dependent on roots and tubers as a significant, 
if not principal, source of food and income. In
many parts of Sub-Saharan Africa, roots and
tubers account for about 20 percent of calorie
consumption. In Asia and Latin America, they
provide an important supplemental source of
carbohydrates, vitamins, and amino acids in
food systems that are dominated by other
commodities. The production and processing 
of roots and tubers, which tend to be very 
l a b o r - i n t e n s i v e , are also important sources of
employment and income. Production of roots
and tubers tends to be concentrated in countries
with lower per capita incomes and, within the
low-income countries, they are typically located
in remote, often marginal, areas with particularly
low levels of income and limited access to farm
inputs. These characteristics make roots and
tubers an important crop for low-income
smallholders in the marginal areas of Africa,
Asia, and Latin America.
While much of the focus in developing-
country food production in recent years has
been on cereals, similarly large rates of increase
in production occurred for potatoes and yams,
although growth was much lower for cassava
and sweet potatoes. By 1995, about 630 million
tons of roots and tubers were produced on 49
million hectares worldwide, with 70 percent of the
production taking place in developing countries.
The estimated annual value of the major roots
and tubers produced in the developing world in
1995–97 amounted to about US$40 billion. 
IMPACT projections suggest that global
demand for roots and tubers will increase by 
37 percent between 1995 and 2020 to reach 
864 million tons, with more than 97 percent of
the increase in production occurring in the
developing world (see figure). Sub-Saharan
Africa alone will account for more than two-fifths
of the increase in demand. Worldwide, demand
for cassava and other minor roots and tubers is
projected to increase by 49 percent, 
for potatoes by 40 percent, and for sweet potatoes
and yams by 30 percent between 1995 and
2020. A rapid expansion in the demand for roots
and tubers for livestock feed has been under
way for some time, particularly in Asia, and is
likely to continue as demand for meat products
grows rapidly in coming years.
Average yields for roots and tubers in
developing countries are well below those in
developed countries, 11.6 tons per hectare
versus 16.7 tons in 1995, and are far below
technically feasible levels. Potential is great 
for increasing production through improved
varieties and other farming innovations as well
as improved policies. Better yields for these
crops would bring significant benefits to the food
systems in developing countries, particularly to
poor producers and consumers. The important
continued and future role of roots and tubers 
in the food systems of developing countries 
has potentially far-reaching implications for
investments in agricultural research at both the
i n t e r n a t i o n a l and national levels.
Box 1
The Contribution of Roots and Tubers
feedgrain is projected to double between
1995 and 2020 to 445 million tons, while
demand for cereals for direct human con-
sumption is projected to increase by 40 
percent to 1,013 million tons (Figure 6). 
By 2020, 27 percent of the cereal demand
in developing countries will be directed to
animal feed, compared with 21 percent in
Share of increase in global demand
for roots and tubers, 1995–2020
Source: IFPRI IMPACT simulations, July 1999.
Note: This box is drawn from information generated by IMPACT simulations as well as from G. J. Scott, M. W. Rosegrant, and C.
Ringler, “Roots and Tubers for the 21st Century: Trends, Projections, and Policy for Developing Countries,” Draft 2020 Vision for Food,
Agriculture, and the Environment Discussion Paper (International Food Policy Research Institute, Washington, D.C., photocopy).13
1995. In developed countries, feed for live-
stock will account for over 70 percent of the
cereal demand, and the increase in cereal
demand for feed will far outstrip the increase
in demand for food between 1995 and 2020. 
By 2020, demand for maize in devel-
oping countries will overtake demand for
rice and wheat (Figure 7). Essentially, as
The Livestock Revolution is a term used by the
authors of a recent 2020 Vision Discussion
Paper, Livestock to 2020: The Next Food
Revolution by Christopher Delgado, Mark
Rosegrant, Henning Steinfeld, Simeon Ehui, and
Claude Courbois, to describe the massive
increases in demand for foods of animal origin
fueled by population growth, urbanization, and
income growth in developing countries over the
next 20 years. Like the Green Revolution, the
Livestock Revolution involves the large-scale
participation by developing countries in
transformations that had previously occurred
mostly in the temperate zones of developed
countries. 
The Livestock Revolution encompasses
seven distinct trends: (1) rapid worldwide
increases in consumption and production of
livestock products; (2) a major increase in the
share of developing countries in total livestock
production and consumption; (3) an ongoing
change in the status of livestock production from
a small-scale local activity to a global activity; 
(4) increased substitution of meat and milk for
grain in the human diet; (5) rapid rise in the use
of cereal-based feeds; (6) greater stress on
grazing resources and more intensive production
closer to cities; and (7) the emergence of rapid
technological change in livestock production and
processing in industrial systems. 
While increased consumption of livestock
products among high-income people in
developed countries who regularly consume
excess calories could lead to health problems,
including cardiovascular diseases, increased
consumption of even relatively small amounts 
of meat and milk among low-income people in
developing countries could contribute to
improving their nutritional status by supplying
necessary proteins and micronutrients as well 
as calories. Similarly, while rapidly increasing
livestock production can cause serious damage
to the environment, when appropriate types and
levels of production are in place it can be
harmonious with the environment.
The Livestock Revolution will undoubtedly
stretch the capacity of existing production and
distribution systems and exacerbate environ-
mental and public health problems. It presents
many opportunities and dangers that suggest 
it would be unwise for developing countries 
to adopt a laissez-faire policy for livestock
development. Governments and industry must
prepare for this continuing transformation with
long-run policies and investments that will satisfy
consumer demand, improve nutrition, direct
income growth opportunities to the poor, and
alleviate environmental and public health stress.
Delgado and his coauthors suggest four broad
pillars on which to base a desirable livestock
strategy for developing countries. These are: 
• Removing policy distortions that promote
artificial economies of scale in livestock
production; 
• Building participatory institutions of collective
action for small-scale farmers that allow them
to be vertically integrated with livestock
processors and input suppliers;
• Creating the environment in which farmers will
increase investment in ways to improve
productivity in the livestock sector; and
• Promoting effective regulatory institutions to
deal with the threat of environmental and
health crises stemming from livestock. 
The Livestock Revolution is a structural
phenomenon that is here to stay. As in the case
of the Green Revolution, the stakes for the poor
in developing countries are enormous. How
good or bad the Livestock Revolution will be for
the people of developing countries depends on
how these countries choose to approach it. 
Lack of policy action will not stop the Livestock
Revolution but it will ensure that the form it takes
is less favorable for growth, poverty alleviation,
and sustainability in developing countries.
Box 2
Preparing for the Livestock Revolution
Note: This box is drawn from C. Delgado, M. Rosegrant, H. Steinfeld, S. Ehui, and C. Courbois, Livestock to 2020: The Next
Food Revolution, 2020 Vision for Food, Agriculture, and the Environment Discussion Paper 28 (Washington, D.C.: International
Food Policy Research Institute,1999).14
incomes rise, per capita demand for rice is
beginning to plateau, but demand for maize
for feed purposes is growing substantially;
this development has major implications for
the world’s agricultural production and
research systems. Driven by the increased
demand for animal feed, demand for maize
in developing countries will increase much
faster than for any other cereal, by a pro-
jected 2.35 percent per year between 1995
and 2020 compared with 2.09 percent for
other grains, 1.58 percent for wheat and
1.23 percent for rice. About 64 percent of
the maize demand will go toward feeding
livestock compared with 8 percent of wheat
and 3 percent of rice in 2020. In China,
where total demand for meat is projected to
double between 1995 and 2020, demand for
maize is forecast to increase by around 2.7
percent per year whereas demand for rice,
the most important staple for human con-
sumption, is projected to increase by only
0.6 percent per year.
The world’s farmers will have to pro-
duce 40 percent more grain in 2020, most
of which will have to come from yield
increases. IMPACTprojections suggest that
farmland cultivated with cereals will increase
by only 7.4 percent or 51 million hectares by
2020, with much of the growth concentrated
in the relatively low-yielding cereals of Sub-
Saharan Africa. A modest expansion in
cereal area is forecast for Latin America, but
virtually no growth is projected for Asia or
the developed countries. IMPACTprojec-
tions suggest that global cereal production
will grow at an average annual rate of 1.3
percent between 1995 and 2020 (Figure 8);
increases in cultivated area are expected to
contribute only one-fifth of the global cereal
production needed to meet demand between
1995 and 2020. Therefore, improvements in
crop yields will be required to bring about
the necessary production increases.
H o w e v e r, growth in farmers’c e r e a l
yields is slowing. In both developed and
developing countries, the rate of increase in
cereal yields is slowing from the heyday of
the Green Revolution in the 1970s (Figure
9). This is due partly to reduced use of
Figure 6—Demand for cereals for human
food and animal feed, 1995–2020
Figure 7—Increase in demand for major
cereals in developing countries,
1995–2020
Figure 8—Sources of growth in cereal
production, 1995–2020
Source: IFPRI IMPACT simulations, July 1999. Source: IFPRI IMPACT simulations, July 1999.
Source: IFPRI IMPACT simulations, July 1999.15
inputs like fertilizer, reflecting low and falling
cereal prices, and partly to low levels of
investment in agricultural research and tech-
n o l o g y. Poorly functioning markets and lack
of appropriate infrastructure and credit are
also contributing factors. Without substantial
and sustained additional investment in agri-
cultural research and associated factors, it
will become more and more difficult to main-
tain, let alone increase, cereal yields in the
longer term. The gap in average cereal
yields between the developed and develop-
ing countries is slowly beginning to narrow,
but it is widening considerably within the
developing world as Sub-Saharan A f r i c a
lags further and further behind the other
regions, particularly East Asia (Figure 10).
Food production will increase much
faster in the developing world than in the
developed world. Between 1995 and 2020,
cereal production in the developing world is
projected to increase by 51 percent from 9 6 5
million tons to 1,460 million tons, whereas in
the developed world cereal production is pro-
jected to increase by only 24 percent from
812 million tons to 1,006 million tons. By
2020, the developing world will be producing
59 percent of the world’s cereals, up from 54
percent in 1995. While both the developing
and the developed world were each produc-
ing about the same volume of meat in 1995,
about 99 million tons, the developing world is
projected to almost double its production
between 1995 and 2020 to 191 million tons
while the developed world is projected to
increase its production by only 24 percent to
123 million tons. By 2020, the developing
world will be producing 61 percent of the
w o r l d ’s meat, up from 50 percent in 1995.
Nevertheless, net cereal imports by
developing countries will almost double
to fill the gap between food production
and demand. Despite large increases,
cereal production in the developing world
will not keep pace with demand. IMPACT
projections suggest that the developing
world’s net cereal imports will increase by
80 percent between 1995 and 2020 to reach
191.6 million tons. With the exception of
Latin America, all major regions are forecast
to increase their net cereal imports (Figure
11). The massive increase forecast in South
Asia’s net cereal imports from 0.3 million
tons in 1995 to 20.8 million tons in 2020 will
arise because domestic production in the
region will not keep up with income and
population growth. In Pakistan, problems
with salinity and waterlogging in the main
cereal production areas will limit crop yield
growth, while population growth will be
rapid. India is projected to shift from moder-
ate cereal exports to moderate imports,
Figure 9—Annual growth in cereal yields,
1967–82, 1982–94, and 1995–2020
Figure 10—Cereal yields, 1995–2020
Source: 1967–82 and 1982–94; Food and Agriculture
Organization of the United Nations, FAOSTAT database
<http://faostat.fao.org>, accessed March 1997; 1995–2020:
IFPRI IMPACT simulations, July 1999.
Source: IFPRI IMPACT simulations, July 1999.16
owing to declining growth in cereal yields
and relatively rapid income growth. Sub-
Saharan Africa’s net cereal imports are
expected to remain low because of lack of
foreign exchange and entrenched poverty.
Wheat will constitute more than half of the
developing world’s net cereal imports, but
the share of maize is projected to rise from
28 to 33 percent between 1995 and 2020
(Figure 12). Trade in rice is forecast to
remain small. About 12 percent of the devel-
oping world’s cereal demand is projected to
be met through net imports from the devel-
oped world, up from 10 percent in 1995.
Net meat imports by developing
countries will increase eightfold between
1995 and 2020. Although trade in meat
products is much smaller than in cereals,
IMPACTprojects that developing countries
will increase their net meat imports from 0.8
million tons to 6.6 million tons. The propor-
tion of the developing world’s meat con-
sumption that will be met through net
imports is forecast to rise from 0.8 to 3.3
percent. Latin America will remain a net
exporter while South Asia will switch from
being a net exporter to a net importer
(Figure 13). East Asia is projected to
increase its net meat imports 28-fold, albeit
from very low levels, primarily because of
the massive increases expected in meat
demand in China. Poultry meat is expected
to constitute 55 percent of the developing
world’s net meat imports in 2020, followed
by pigmeat at 28 percent and beef and
sheepmeat at 9 percent each.
About 60 percent of the developing
world’s net cereal imports in 2020 will
come from the United States. With a 34
percent increase projected in its net cereal
exports between 1995 and 2020, the United
States will continue to capture a large share
of the increased export market for cereals
(Figure 14). However, with the projected
emergence of Eastern Europe and the for-
mer Soviet Union as major net exporters of
cereals and the increase in net exports fore-
Figure 13—Meat trade of major developing
regions, 1995 and 2020
Figure 12—Composition of net cereal imports
of major developing regions, 
1995 and 2020
Figure 11—Net cereal imports of major
developing regions, 1995 and 2020
Source: IFPRI IMPACT simulations, July 1999.
Source: IFPRI IMPACT simulations, July 1999.
Source: IFPRI IMPACT simulations, July 1999.17
cast for the European Union and Australia,
the market share of the United States in the
net cereal exports of the developed world is
projected to decline from 80 percent in 1995
to 60 percent in 2020. The outcomes of the
upcoming WTO negotiations and related
changes in domestic subsidies in the United
States and the European Union, as well as
developments related to biotechnology and
genetically modified foods, may influence
trade patterns.
Food prices will remain steady or fall
slightly between 1995 and 2020. Real
world prices of food are projected to decline,
but at much slower rates than in the past
two decades (Figure 15). Cereal prices on
average are projected to drop by about
US$19 per metric ton by 2020 (about 17
percent). The much slower decrease in food
prices, compared with past trends, is due to
the continued slowdown in crop yield
increases, as well as strong growth in
demand for meat in developing countries.
Real cereal prices are expected to increase
slightly through the year 2010. It is only after
2010 that the continued decline in the rate
of population growth, combined with declin-
ing income elasticities of demand for cere-
als, will reduce demand growth enough to
cause cereal prices to resume their long-
term downward trend. By comparison,
between 1982 and 1995, real world wheat
prices dropped by 28 percent, rice prices by
42 percent, and maize prices by 43 percent.
With increased production and
imports, per capita food availability in
the developing world will increase.
IMPACTprojections indicate that about
2,800 calories will be available per person
per day in the developing world by 2020, 
an increase of about 9 percent over 1995.
Increases in per capita food availability are
expected in all regions. China is projected to
experience the largest increase, and West
Asia and North Africa the smallest increase,
albeit from already high levels (Figure 16).
At less than 2,300 calories per person per
day, average food availability in Sub-
Figure 16—Daily per capita calorie availability,
1995 and 2020
Figure 14—Net trade in cereal of developed
countries, 1995 and 2020
Figure 15—World prices of major
commodities, 1995–2020
Source: IFPRI IMPACT simulations, July 1999.
Source: IFPRI IMPACT simulations, July 1999. Source: IFPRI IMPACT simulations, July 1999.18
Saharan Africa will barely meet the require-
ments for a healthy and productive life. 
And since available food will not be equally
distributed, many Africans will have less
than the minimum required.
In the scenario described here, food
insecurity and malnutrition will persist in
2020 and beyond. Under the most likely
scenario, IMPA C T projects that 135 million
children under five years of age will be 
malnourished in 2020 (Figure 17).1 0 This rep-
resents a decline of only 15 percent from 160
million in 1995. Hence, one out of every four
children in developing countries will still be
malnourished in 2020 compared with every
third child in 1995. Child malnutrition is
expected to decline in all major developing
regions except Sub-Saharan Africa, where
the number of malnourished children is fore-
cast to increase by about 30 percent to reach
40 million by 2020. In South Asia, despite a
reduction in the number of malnourished 
children by 18 million, as many as two out of
five children will still be malnourished in 2020
(Figure 18). With more than 77 percent of the
developing world’s malnourished children in
2020, up from 70 percent in 1995, Sub-
Saharan Africa and South Asia will remain
“hot spots” of child malnutrition and food
i n s e c u r i t y. Many of the countries in these 
two regions are among the least-developed
countries in the world; they will require spe-
cial assistance to avert widespread hunger
and malnutrition in the years to come.
In summary, the world food situation at
the threshold of the 21st century is mixed:
astonishing advances in agricultural produc-
tivity and human ingenuity have not yet
translated into a world free of hunger and
malnutrition. Dramatic changes in food pro-
duction, processing, and trade in recent
decades have resulted in enough food to
meet the basic needs of each and every
person in the world. Doubling grain produc-
tion and tripling livestock production since
the early 1960s has made available about
2,700 calories per person per day. Yet, about
820 million people lack access to sufficient
food to lead healthy and productive lives,11
and about 160 million children are seriously
underweight for their age.
This mixed outlook for the world food 
situation could be significantly worse with
increased policy complacency or greater
than anticipated constraints in or deteriora-
tion of key variables such as water avail-
ability, land quality, human resource
development, and technological innova-
tions. On the other hand, with concerted
political will and appropriate investments, 
a food-secure world is within reach.
Ultimately, our behavior, priorities, and 
policies will determine the nature of the
world food situation in the 21st century.
Figure 17—Number of malnourished children, 
1995 and 2020
Figure 18—Percentage of malnourished
children, 1995 and 2020
Source: IFPRI IMPACT simulations, July 1999. Source: IFPRI IMPACT simulations, July 1999.19
EMERGING ISSUES
D
escribed here are six critical recent
developments or emerging issues that
could significantly influence and alter the
outlook for the world food situation in the
early years of the next century.
New Evidence on Nutrition and Policy 
New information confirms that while the
global nutrition situation is improving, nutri-
tional status is deteriorating in several coun-
tries, particularly in Africa. Research shows
that about 33 percent of preschool children
in the developing world will be stunted by
2000.12 This is a significant decline from the
prevalence rate of 47 percent just 20 years
ago. In terms of numbers, about 182 million
children are expected to be stunted in 2000,
down from 221 million in 1980. Although the
prevalence of stunted children has
decreased and is expected to continue to do
so beyond 2005 in the three major develop-
ing regions (Figure 19), the number of stunt-
ed children has increased significantly in
Africa, from less than 35 million in 1980 to
45 million in 1995, and is projected to reach
49 million in 2005 (Figure 20). While the
number of stunted children is higher than
the number of malnourished children pre-
sented in the previous section, Sub-Saharan
Africa is clearly a region of grave concern
for both.
New evidence shows that low birth
weight continues to be a major contributor
to child malnutrition and premature death.13
About one in four children born in 2000 is
expected to suffer from insufficient fetal
growth and resulting low birth weight. The
poor fetal growth and low birth weight are
caused by mother’s poor nutrition both
before conception and during pregnancy. 
New information on consumption of
micronutrients such as vitamins and miner-
als confirms that anemia stemming from
i n s u fficient iron intake is widespread among
women, particularly pregnant women, and
children (Figure 21). About 2 billion people
s u ffer from iron deficiency anemia.1 4
S i m i l a r l y, data from a large number of coun-
tries show that vitamin A deficiencies are
widespread. Recently updated information
Figure 19—Estimated prevalence of stunted
children, 1995–2020
Figure 20—Estimated number of stunted
children, 1995–2020
Source: Subcommittee on Nutrition of the United Nations
Administrative Committee on Coordination/International
Food Policy Research Institute (SCN/IFPRI), “Fourth Report
on the World Nutrition Situation” (SCN/IFPRI, Washington,
D.C., July 1999, photocopy).
Source: Subcommittee on Nutrition of the United Nations
Administrative Committee on Coordination/International
Food Policy Research Institute (SCN/IFPRI), “Fourth Report
on the World Nutrition Situation” (SCN/IFPRI, Washington,
D.C., July 1999, photocopy).20
on iodine deficiency disorders (IDD) indi-
cates that this is a public health problem in
130 countries around the world, with more
than 2 billion people at risk of IDD and about
740 million people affected with goiter.1 5
Researchers have been working to iden-
tify which policy-related variables are likely
to help improve the nutritional status of chil-
dren. New IFPRI research finds four critical
reasons why child nutrition improved in the
developing world between 1970 and 1995:
improvements in women’s education
accounted for almost 45 percent of the total
reduction in child malnutrition during this
period, followed by improvements in per
capita food availability, improvements in the
health environment, and improvements in
women’s status relative to men (Figure 22).
This research suggests that investments in
these four areas could significantly reduce
child malnutrition but warns that these
investments will make little difference with-
out improvements in national incomes and
democracy.16 For Sub-Saharan Africa and
South Asia—where the proportion and num-
ber of malnourished children are highest—
improving per capita food availability and
women’s education offers the best hope for
reducing child malnutrition in the future, the
study concludes.
Comparing African countries that
showed improved child malnutrition with
those that showed worsening malnutrition
leads to similar conclusions. The countries
with improved nutritional status had larger
increases in the enrollment of women in
secondary school, in per capita food con-
sumption, and in per capita incomes.17
Furthermore, although women’s status dete-
riorated in both groups, it deteriorated much
more in countries where the nutritional sta-
tus worsened. The data do not establish
strict causality, but this analysis provided
strong indications that women’s schooling,
women’s status, per capita food intake, and
per capita incomes are important determi-
nants of child nutrition in Africa. 
The presence of civil conflict increases
vulnerability to food insecurity, and vice
versa.18 Recent information from the Food
and Agriculture Organization of the United
Nations vividly demonstrates that the 
incidence of undernourishment or food 
insecurity is highest in countries with a high
incidence of civil conflict. For example, 56
percent of the countries where more than
Figure 21—Prevalence of anemia in pre-
school children and pregnant
women by region
Figure 22—Estimated contribution of major
determinants to reductions in child
malnutrition, 1970–95
Source: Subcommittee on Nutrition of the United Nations
Administrative Committee on Coordination/International
Food Policy Research Institute (SCN/IFPRI), “Fourth Report
on the World Nutrition Situation” (SCN/IFPRI, Washington,
D.C., July 1999, photocopy).
Source: L. Smith and L. Haddad, “Overcoming Child
Malnutrition in Developing Countries: Past Performance,
Future Possibilities,” Draft 2020 Vision for Food, Agriculture,
and the Environment Discussion Paper (International Food
Policy Research Institute, Washington, D.C., photocopy).
Note: Malnourished children refers to underweight children.21
half of the population was undernourished
were experiencing conflict while only 8 per-
cent of the countries with the lowest inci-
dence of undernourishment were mired in
conflict (Figure 23). Similarly, child mortality
rates are highest in those countries where a
larger proportion of the population is under-
nourished; in other words, child mortality
rates decline as the prevalence of food 
insecurity declines.
The large numbers of malnourished 
children and the upward trend in Sub-
Saharan Africa make it more urgent than
ever for research and government policy to
address this unfolding human tragedy. A
conference held at the International Rice
Research Institute (IRRI) on October 5–7,
1999, explored opportunities for enhancing
the nutrition impact of the research 
conducted by the research centers of the
Consultative Group on International
Agricultural Research (CGIAR) and national
agricultural research systems. It is critical
that every reasonable effort be made to
assure that future CGIAR priorities reflect
the widespread human suffering and eco-
nomic losses associated with malnutrition
and the urgency of reducing and eventually
eliminating such malnutrition.
Low Food Prices: 
What Will the Future Bring?
World market prices for wheat, maize, and
rice, adjusted for inflation, are the lowest they
have been in the last century (Figure 24).
Prices fell dramatically in the 1980s,
although some adjustments in the early
1990s resulted in a relatively large price
increase for wheat and maize during 1995
and the first half of 1996. Since then, the real
international prices for wheat, maize, and
rice have once again dropped significantly to
the current very low levels. The severity of
the price fluctuations since the mid-1990s is
illustrated by the prices received by United
States farmers (Figure 25). Maize and wheat
prices increased about 70 and 50 percent,
respectively from April 1995 to April 1996. By
April 1999, they had dropped to less than
half of the 1996 level. U.S. soybean prices
are expected to fall to their lowest level since
1972/73, and the stock is likely to double
from last year.1 9 The fluctuation in the rice
price was considerably less.
Why these severe price fluctuations? 
As further discussed elsewhere,20 a number
of factors coincided in 1995 to raise prices:
adverse weather conditions in Canada and
Figure 23—Food security, civil conflicts, and
child mortality, 1990–96
Figure 24—Real export prices for wheat,
maize, and rice in selected years,
1 9 1 0 – 1 9 9 9
Source: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations,
Assessment of the World Food Security Situation, Report No.
CFS:99/2 of the 25th Session of the Committee on World Food
Security, Rome, May 31–June 2 (Rome: FAO, 1999).
Note: Countries grouped by prevalence of undernourishment.
Source: D. Gale Johnson, “The Growth of Demand Will Limit
Output Growth for Food over the Next Quarter Century,” P N A S
Online 96 (11, 1999): 5915-5920; USDA, <http://www.usda.gov>
(accessed August 1999); U.S. Department of Labor,
<http://www.dol.gov> (accessed August 1999); World Bank,
<http://www.worldbank.org> (accessed August 1999).22
the United States, drought and civil conflict
in Sub-Saharan Africa, stagnating grain
yields in Asia, set-aside programs and
reduced subsidies in the European Union,
and decreased food production in the 
former Soviet Union and China. Some 
countries buffered both consumers and
farmers from the higher grain prices, but 
in countries that did not, farmers expanded
the area of land cultivated with grain. World-
wide, the wheat and coarse grain area
increased by 5 and 3 percent, respectively,
between 1995/96 and 1996/97. As prices
began to drop, farmers cut back area, and it
is expected that by 1999/2000, the wheat
area will be back to the 1995/96 level, while
the coarse grain area will be 3 percent
below the 1995/96 level (Figure 26). The
area adjustments in the world’s largest grain
exporter, the United States, were consider-
ably greater: U.S. farmers increased the
wheat area by close to 9 percent between
1995/96 and 1996/97 and cut it back by 16
percent during the subsequent three years.
The maize area was increased by 11 per-
cent and has stayed at that level since
1996/97.
Despite declines in the area planted to
wheat and maize, yield increases due to 
past investments in improved technology
have kept total production on the rise since
1996/97. Thus, farmers are expected to pro-
duce 7 percent more wheat in 1999/2000
than they did in 1995/96, on the same
amount of land. Similarly, although the 
global maize area is expected to fall by 3 per-
cent from its 1995/96 level, global production
is expected to be 10 percent higher. U.S.
maize production is expected to be 30 per-
cent larger in 1999/2000 than it was in
1996/97. The increase in global maize pro-
duction is influenced not only by productivity-
increasing technologies but also by the larger
share of the global maize area occupied by
the United States (where yields are higher). 
So why have grain prices fallen so
severely since mid-1996? The answer
comes straight from basic economics: The
production increases exceeded demand at
existing prices. Even after it became obvi-
ous that the high prices of early to mid-1996
could not be maintained, farmers did not cut
area planted sufficiently to compensate for
the long-term trend in productivity increase.
Favorable weather in major producing areas
also contributed to production increases.
While production was rising, demand was
falling. As a result of their economic crisis,
Asian countries sharply reduced their
imports of livestock products and grain, and
a deepening crisis in the former Soviet
Union reduced imports of grain and live-
stock products by that region. China
switched from being a major net grain
Figure 26—World area and production for
wheat and coarse grains,
1 9 9 5 – 2 0 0 0
Figure 25—Average real prices received by
U.S. farmers, 1995–99
Source: IFPRI calculations from U.S. Departments of Agriculture
and Labor data.
Note: For 1995–97, preliminary April averages are used. For
1998–99, actual April averages are used.
Source: United States Department of Agriculture, A g r i c u l t u r a l
Outlook, August, Publication No. AGO-263 (Washington, D.C.:
Economic Research Service, USDA, 1999). 
Note: Coarse grains include maize.23
importer in 1995–96 to being a net exporter
in 1997–98. 
As grain prices fell, the low world grain
stock of 1996 was rebuilt and reached 337
million tons in 1999, corresponding to 17.9
percent of expected annual consumption
(Figure 27). The stock adjustments in
response to the high prices in 1995–96 and
the falling prices since then occurred pri-
marily in the major exporting countries. 
What does the future hold? There is little
doubt that the current maize and wheat
prices are below the long-term trend. It is
difficult to predict how long it will take to
return to the trend. Although increased cli-
matic variations may cause larger produc-
tion fluctuations in the future, current large
grain stocks and the continued productivity
increases make it difficult to believe that
prices will spike significantly in the next few
years. However, the current low grain prices
are causing large income losses among
farmers in countries where international
prices are transmitted to them. This is the
case in the United States and most other
traditional grain exporters. Further cuts in
area planted to wheat and maize, along with
reduced fertilizer use, is likely. Additional
decreases in grain production could result if
the European Union and the United States
decide to reintroduce or expand area set-
aside programs. Areturn to rapid economic
growth in Asia would increase grain and
livestock consumption and imports, as would
improvements in the economic situation in
the former Soviet Union. Depending on how
these factors play out, and barring unprece-
dented bad weather in the major producing
areas, it seems reasonable to expect that
real grain prices will stay below the trend for
at least the next couple of years. 
Trade Negotiations: 
Preparing for the Next WTO Round 
Recent analyses reported in various IFPRI
publications, including the annual report and
a collection of 2020 policy briefs, indicate
that in the upcoming WTO round of agricul-
tural trade negotiations, expected to begin
in November 1999, poor countries and poor
people risk losing out on the economic bene-
fits embodied in further trade liberalization.2 1
To gain from trade talks, developing coun-
tries must participate effectively in the 
n e g otiations. Among other things, developing
countries should pursue better access to
markets in industrial countries for their 
agricultural commodities. However, without
appropriate domestic economic and agricul-
tural policies, developing countries in general
and poor people in particular will not be able
to capture fully the potential economic bene-
fits from international trade liberalization. 
According to FAO, the most frequent
problems confronted by developing countries
in their participation in the debate on interna-
tional agreements related to agriculture and
trade are inadequate administrative and 
legal capacity to meet WTO requirements;
i n s u fficient national policy formulation capacity;
limited scientific, administrative, and infra-
structure capability to deal with food standards;
and lack of plant variety protection.2 2
As shown in Figure 28, the African share
of world agricultural trade continues to
decline rapidly. While it is too early to esti-
mate the impact of the Uruguay Round on
Figure 27—World cereal stock carryover,
1 9 9 3 – 2 0 0 0
Source: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations,
<http://faostat.fao.org> (accessed August 1999).
aArgentina, Australia, Canada, European Union, and the United
S t a t e s .
bE s t i m a t e d .
cF o r e c a s t .24
Africa, research results indicate that the
round will have adverse economic effects
for most of the countries in Sub-Saharan
Africa. The negative effects can be large
and will be worse in countries that fail to
undertake the necessary domestic policy
reforms. Without such reforms, these coun-
tries are less able to respond effectively to
opportunities arising from more liberalized
agricultural trade. Failure to participate as
the rest of the world moves toward a more
liberalized trade regime may isolate Africa
from the mainstream world economy. 
The only real option for African and
other low-income developing countries is to
try to strengthen their bargaining position
and pursue a set of key goals for both
domestic policies and international trade
arrangements. The most important issues
include the following:
•  Continue to pursue domestic policy
reforms that remove distortions adverse
to small farmers and the poor while facil-
itating access to the benefits from more
open trade;
•  Gain better access to industrial-country
markets, particularly free entry for goods
from the least-developed countries and
the elimination of tariff escalation;
•  Eliminate export subsidies in industrial
countries and export taxes and controls
that exacerbate price fluctuations in
world markets;
•  Obtain technical assistance and finan-
cial support from industrial countries to
develop the agricultural sectors in low-
income developing countries;
•  Continue a strong sanitary and phyto-
sanitary framework domestically and
seek technical support to help produce
at the standards expected in developed-
country markets; and
•  Gain adequate levels of food aid target-
ed to poor groups, in ways that do not
displace domestic production.23
The Potential of Agroecological
Approaches 
Although the Green Revolution technologies
have been responsible for enormous pro-
ductivity increases among small-scale farm-
ers in Asia, Latin America, and a few
countries of Sub-Saharan Africa, many
farmers have been bypassed. The desire 
to find ways of assisting these farmers,
combined with concerns about excessive
dependence on external inputs such as 
fertilizers, pesticides, and irrigation water
embodied in the Green Revolution technolo-
gies, has stimulated interest in alternative or
complementary approaches, including the
so-called “agroecological approach.” 
The agroecological approach aims to
reduce the amount of external inputs that
farmers have to use. Instead, it relies heavily
on available farm labor and organic material,
as well as on improved knowledge and farm
management. Thus, while the agroecological
approach needs more external inputs in the
area of knowledge and management, physi-
cal external inputs such as fertilizers, pesti-
cides, and irrigation water are reduced. A
large number of nongovernmental organiza-
tions have dedicated themselves to providing
such knowledge inputs in direct collaboration
with farmers and farmer representatives. T h e
agroecological approach also focuses on
farm-level research and experimentation
Figure 28—African share of world agricultural
t r a d e
Source: N. Mukherjee and R. L. Harris, “Getting Ready for the
Millennium Round Trade Negotiations: African Perspective,” 2020
Vision Focus 1, Brief 4 (Washington, D.C.: International Food
Policy Research Institute, 1999).25
rather than dependence on the more formal
agricultural research structures. Use of local-
ly available materials such as crop residues,
farm manure, and compost to improve soil
fertility is an important part of the agro-
ecological approach, as is integrated pest
management. While the definition of the
agroecological approach does not exclude
the use of chemical fertilizers and chemical
pesticides, it argues that such chemical
inputs should be used only as a last resort. 
Agroecological approaches tend to be
very labor demanding, and the returns to
labor from many agroecological activities
tend to be low. Therefore, as agricultural
development increases the opportunity cost
of labor, agroecological approaches will
need to adjust to reduce labor requirements.
This will probably mean moving away from
such activities as mulching and composting
toward chemical fertilizers and other inputs
that enhance labor productivity. Many
agroecological approaches, such as the
production of green manure, tend to be 
land using. While this may be appropriate 
in certain communities where land is abun-
dant, it may be inappropriate in areas with
severe land scarcity. 
Low and declining soil fertility is a seri-
ous problem in many low-income countries,
including most of Africa. Figure 29 shows
the average annual nutrient depletion in
Africa during the early to mid-1990s. About
86 percent of the countries in Africa show
negative balances of nutrients greater than
30 kilograms of NPK per hectare per year.
The cost of eliminating this nutrient deple-
tion by using fertilizer would amount to
US$1.5 billion per year.24 Although improved
soil conservation measures, recycling of
crop residues, better rotation schemes, and
use of nitrogen-fixing legumes as well as
farm manure are important to deal with soil
fertility problems, expanded use of chemical
fertilizers will be necessary to effectively
solve the soil fertility problem in most of the
low-income countries. 
The current average consumption of
chemical fertilizers in Africa is 10–15 kilo-
grams per hectare, and its use is heavily
concentrated on a small number of export
crops. Failure to combine expanded use of
chemical fertilizers with agroecological
methods is likely to result in further declines
in soil fertility and crop yields to the detri-
ment of the livelihoods of small-scale farm-
ers in Africa. Furthermore, opportunities for
using modern biotechnology to develop
cereal varieties that could fix nitrogen from
the air and extract phosphorus from acid
soils should be explored. 
One of the great strengths of the 
agroecological approach is that it pro-
motes sustainable management of natural
resources and active participation by 
farmers in identifying problems as well as
designing and implementing appropriate
solutions at the farm and community levels.
Such participatory technology development
can be extremely effective in finding the
most appropriate solutions to production
problems.
Figure 29—Average annual nutrient depletion
(NPK) in Africa, 1993–95
Source: J. Henao and C. Baanante, “Nutrient Depletion in the
Agricultural Soils of Africa,” 2020 Vision Brief 62 (Washington, D.C.:
International Food Policy Research Institute, 1999).26
A large number of projects and initia-
tives have successfully applied agroeco-
logical approaches to expand yields and
improve the livelihoods of farm families.25
Illustrations from more than 30 African,
Asian, and Latin American countries demon-
strate the tremendous potential of agroeco-
logical approaches to promote sustainable
productivity increases in small-scale agricul-
ture. While some approaches will have to
change in response to increasing agricultur-
al development and changes in farmer
incomes and opportunity costs, such
changes should come about easily as a
result of farmer participation and leadership.
Therefore, it is critical that farmers are, in
fact, put in decisionmaking roles and that
they are informed about their options for
improving productivity, reducing risks, and
increasing the well-being of the farm family.
Such options should include access to
external inputs and appropriate technolo-
gies to complement agroecological
approaches. Farmers should not be made
to suffer from the current debate among
professionals over which approach is the
most appropriate. Farmers should be able
to put together the most appropriate compo-
nents from each of the various “approaches”
in order to develop their own solutions.
Attempts to persuade farmers to pursue one
approach over another, rather than combin-
ing the most appropriate elements of the
various approaches, is not in their best 
interest. For example, combining certain
agroecological approaches with access to
chemical fertilizers to supplement available
organic matter and access to improved
seeds containing characteristics such as
drought tolerance and resistance to certain
pests is likely to be the most appropriate
way to assist certain small-scale farmers.
Although on-farm experimentation should 
be an important part of the overall agri-
cultural research effort, both the public- 
and the private-sector agricultural research
systems have a role in developing tech-
nology that would be of interest to small-
scale farmers. 
The Potential of Modern Biotechnology 
The extent to which modern biotechnology
will contribute to the achievement of food
security for all is still an open question.
While molecular biology-based science is
moving at great speed, its application to
agriculture has been mostly limited to 
solving problems facing farmers in the
industrial countries and large farmers in 
a few developing countries. Most of the
commercialization of transgenic seed has
occurred for soybeans, maize, and cotton in
the United States, and to a lesser extent in
Argentina, Canada, Mexico, China, and
South Africa (Figure 30). 
Strong opposition to genetically modified
food (GM food) in the European Union has
resulted in severe restrictions for modern
biotechnology for agriculture. The opposition
is driven in part by the perceived lack of con-
sumer benefits of the transgenic foods avail-
able to date, uncertainty about possible
negative health and environmental eff e c t s ,
and a widespread perception that a few large
corporations will be the primary beneficiaries
of modern biotechnology for agriculture. 
Consumers, who in most European
countries outnumber farmers by a factor of
more than 20, see few if any benefits or
potential benefits from GM foods. The bene-
fits from the current generation of transgenic
crops, which are resistant to herbicides and
Figure 30—Area of transgenic crops, 1998
Source: C. James, Global Review of Commercialized Transgenic
Crops: 1998, ISAAA Brief 8 (Ithaca, N.Y., U.S.A.: International
Service for the Acquisition of Agri-biotech Applications, 1998).27
certain pests, accrue primarily to farmers.
Consumer benefits might include reduced
pesticide residues in the food as chemical
pesticides are replaced by pest-resistant
varieties. Even when biotechnology helps
lower the unit costs of production, existing
EU price and subsidy policies may prevent
consumers from seeing lower prices. Even if
they did, food occupies a small share of the
consumer budget, and price falls would not
be of great importance to European con-
sumers. At the same time, an effective cam-
paign by advocacy groups in some EU
countries, fueled in large measure by the
news media, has emphasized the potential
risks associated with GM foods. Even
though the evidence of these risks is weak,
the uncertainty in the minds of many is real.
Given that the expected benefits are small,
opposition is perfectly reasonable. 
The situation is very different for poor
people in the developing countries. First,
60–70 percent of the poor live in rural areas
and depend directly or indirectly on produc-
tivity increases in agriculture to get out of
p o v e r t y. Biotechnology, if appropriately
focused on solving small farmers’ p r o b l e m s ,
together with traditional research methods,
better agronomic practices, and better mar-
kets and policies, may help these farmers to
increase productivity. Second, biotechnology
may help farmers reduce production risks by
making available crop varieties that are
drought tolerant, pest resistant, and able to
capture nitrogen from the air. Third, biotech-
nology to increase the content of iron or 
vitamin A or to make other nutritional
improvements in foods may address serious
and widespread nutritional problems among
the poor in developing countries. Fourth,
increased productivity will, in most develop-
ing countries, result in both higher incomes
for small farmers and lower food prices. T h i s
is important for the poor, who typically spend
50 percent or more of their incomes on food. 
Although much of the past molecular
biology-based research should be useful as
a starting point for the development of
biotechnology suited for small farmers in
developing countries, very little adaptive
research has been undertaken. Except for a
few of the larger or better-off countries such
as Brazil, China, Egypt, India, Mexico, and
South Africa, most of the developing coun-
tries are unable or unlikely to mount effec-
tive agricultural biotechnology research
programs without support or partnerships
from outside the country. The CGIAR cen-
ters are well placed to bridge the gap
between biotechnology research in industri-
al countries and the needs of the small
farmers in developing countries, but only a
small share of their budget is spent on such
adaptive research. The large life-science
corporations, which are responsible for most
of the applied agricultural biotechnology
research to date, focus on industrial-country
agriculture, where they can expect to recu-
perate the costs of the research. With some
exceptions, small farmers in developing
countries do not offer a profitable market at
this time. Yet, the social benefits of develop-
ing and applying appropriate biotechnology
for small farmers are likely to be high. They
include reduced risks from biotic and abiotic
factors, increased yields, foods that are
more nutritious and easier to store, develop-
ment of edible vaccines in staple foods, and
protection of the environment through
reduced use of fertilizers and pesticides and
reduced pressure on land currently not
under cultivation. As usual, in cases where
the private sector cannot capture large
social benefits, the public sector needs to
either invest or introduce policies that will
assure that enough of the social benefits
can be captured by the private sector to
warrant investment. 
Delivering the potential benefits of agri-
cultural research in general and biotechnol-
ogy in particular to small farmers and poor
consumers in developing countries will
require a combination of expanded public
investment by developing countries and the
CGIAR as well as public-private partner-
ships. Governments in industrial and devel-
oping countries also have an important role
to play in regulating the biotechnology28
industry. They must develop effective
biosafety regulations, create and enforce
appropriate intellectual property rights legis-
lation, and enforce antitrust legislation to
counter excessive concentration in the life
science and seed industry. Relevant infor-
mation on these issues must be made avail-
able to the public. If these steps are not
taken, modern biotechnology will bypass the
poor; opportunities for reducing poverty,
food insecurity, and child malnutrition will
not become reality; and the productivity gap
between developing and industrial coun-
tries’ agriculture will widen. Afuller discus-
sion of biotechnology for developing
countries is forthcoming from IFPRI.26
Information Technology and Precision
Farming: Relevance for Small Farmers 
The revolutionary developments in informa-
tion and communication technology (ICT)
during the last few years have resulted in
dramatic falls in the cost of processing and
transmitting information.27 The price of
bandwidth has been dropping by a factor of
100 every 10 years,28 and digitalization and
compression have reduced the amount of
bandwidth needed for both wired and wire-
less telecommunications.29 The widespread
belief that modern information and commu-
nication technology is relevant only for rich
countries and nonpoor people is not only
incorrect, but dangerous, because it may
become a self-fulfilling prophecy. To view
ICT as irrelevant for poor people will further
exclude them from the mainstream of soci-
ety, increase the gap between poor and
nonpoor, and forgo opportunities for alleviat-
ing poverty. It will also expand the gap
between rich and poor nations. ICT, like
electricity, is a key generic technology. Its
utility for the poor will be determined by how
it is used and the related institutions and
policies, not by the nature of the technology
as such. 
ICT offers tremendous opportunities 
for reducing rural poverty in developing
countries. Traditional information and 
communication technologies, such as wired
telephones, fail to reach a large share of the
rural poor partly because the wires are
either not in place or not maintained in
many rural areas and partly because exist-
ing institutions and rationing systems favor
the nonpoor. Satellite-based cell phones
and internet access can bypass the
rationing system and, possibly, the existing
antipoor institutions. At the same time, 
dramatic decreases in the cost of solar 
panels and wind energy make it feasible for
the rural poor to power ICT, including cell
phones, internet access, radio, and 
television, with solar and wind energy. 
The massive capital investments in, for
example, electrical and telephone wiring
may no longer be needed. 
Access to ICT and energy opens up new
opportunities for education, primary health
care, and agricultural extension as well as
for conveying information on markets, trans-
port options, road conditions, employment
opportunities, and other issues important to
the rural poor. It will help not only farmers
but also traders and rural wage laborers. 
Access to ICT by rural people in devel-
oping countries is currently constrained by
high costs and lack of appropriate institu-
tions and policies. Where facilitating institu-
tions have been developed, collective use 
of ICT, such as cell phones, internet, and 
e-mail, at the village level is becoming 
economically feasible as costs continue to
fall. The Grameen Bank has initiated a 
community-based cell phone project in rural
areas of Bangladesh, and village kiosks,
cybercafes, and individual low-income 
people are offering ICT-based services in
several African countries.30 Farmers in parts
of Africa are beginning to use ICT to get
market information and thereby improve the
competition in agricultural input and output
markets. Almost all African countries are
now connected to the internet, but access 
in rural areas is still limited. 
Access to global information systems
(GIS), global positioning systems (GPS),29
and remote sensing is contributing to
increasing application of precision farming
in the United States and Europe. Precision
farming helps farmers to use inputs such as
fertilizers, pesticides, and water more effi-
ciently. It reduces waste, use of chemicals,
runoff, and pollution of land and water.
Thus, it contributes to lower unit costs of
production, more sustainable management
of natural resources, and reduced health
risks associated with agricultural production.
Precision farming as practiced in the
United States and Europe is inappropriate
for small farmers in developing countries
because it relies on capital-intensive equip-
ment used on large farms, but the principle
is highly applicable. In fact, it should be an
integral part of sustainable farming practices
for small farmers because it increases the
efficiency of plant nutrients and other inputs,
while protecting the environment and help-
ing to assure sustainable management of
natural resources. Like agroecological
approaches, it is knowledge and manage-
ment intensive. If appropriate small-scale
and inexpensive equipment were devel-
oped, GIS, GPS, and remote sensing could
help small farmers get the information they




FPRI projections suggest that, under the
most likely scenario, food insecurity and
child malnutrition will remain widespread in
2020. Many millions of people will suffer
from hunger and its debilitating conse-
quences. This does not have to be so. 
If we can mobilize the revolutionary devel-
opments in information technology and
biotechnology for the benefit of the poor and
food-insecure in developing countries; if we
can renew our investments in the factors
essential for agricultural growth, including
agricultural research, human resource
development, and strengthened agroeco-
logical approaches; if we can harness the
political will to adopt sound policies for 
eradicating poverty, fostering food security,
and protecting natural resources; and if we
can alter our behaviors and priorities to
assure sustainable development, a food-
secure world—a world in which every per-
son is assured of access at all times to the
food required to lead healthy and productive
lives—will be within our reach. This is not 
an insurmountable task. We have already
made great strides in reducing the burden of
food insecurity around the world. Building
on the progress made and taking the
actions described here should enable us to
finally realize a food-secure world in the 
21st century.30
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